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Privatization in Emerging Markets
The Case of Turkey
Abstract: This paper discusses the progress and success of the privatization programs in
Turkey between 1985 and 1998. The paper discusses the legal developments, privatization
methods, and performance of privatized companies and overall success of privatization by
comparing the results of privatization with the aims and objectives stated initially. Within
this framework, the paper presents the productivity increases or decreases in various priva-
tized state enterprises, discusses the impact on stock market development, and the
privatization revenues and cash results. Only 8.3 percent of the large state-owned enter-
prises have been privatized during this period. Net cash flow generated from the privatization
process does not appear to be satisfactory, and the impact on the stock market and the
economy is not very impressive. Turkey still needs to privatize its largest state-owned enter-
prises in order to realize the full effects of the privatization program.
Key words: developing country, privatization, Turkey.
The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the ease in the flow of capital
across national borders in the process of globalization. Investors around the world
included assets of foreign countries in their portfolios in an effort to further reduce
risk and diversify effectively. Since the claims of international creditors during
times of recession created financial burdens on developing countries, such coun-
tries that have borrowed heavily from international banks during the 1970s have
realized that banks are not the only, nor necessarily the best, source of funds for
development. Thus, in an effort to obtain capital from different sources, most of
the developing countries have decreased restrictions on foreign investment.
Can Simga-Mugan (sigma@bilkent.edu.tr) is currently at Bilkent University, Ankara,
and was a visiting associate professor in the Department of Accounting and Law, SUNY–
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fessor of finance in the Faculty of Business at Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada.
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As the market for capital becomes more global and less local, the importance of
stock exchanges outside the developed countries increases. Investors perceive that
growth opportunities are greater in those nations that are not yet economically
mature. Traditionally, investors avoided these markets because of the political risks
and the restrictions imposed upon foreign investors. However, in recent years the
political risk of emerging markets has reduced tremendously. Moreover, there ex-
ists a trend within developing countries to ease the restrictions that discourage
foreign investment.
The Turkish administration passed a decree on January 24, 1980, to liberalize the
economy that also started the impetus for privatization of the state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs). The first legal step in privatization started with the enactment of Law
No. 2983 in 1984. Next, the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) started its operations on
January 1, 1986, with fifty listed companies. All barriers to foreign investment were
removed with Decree No. 32 (August 11, 1989), giving (1) the foreign investors the
right to invest in Turkish stocks and mutual funds without getting the permission of
the government and (2) the domestic investors the right to invest in foreign markets.
Thus, the infrastructure of the privatization procedure has been prepared. As a re-
sult, the privatization process started in 1986 and still continues.
The main impetus behind the privatization of SOEs was the burden they placed
on the national budget. Since 1986, some complete and partial privatization of the
SOEs has been accomplished. Although there are studies that addressed various
aspects of privatization in Turkey (Keller et al. 1994; Kilci 1998; Onis 1991; Perotti
and Guney 1993), the realization of the privatization program has not been dis-
cussed in detail. In an attempt to provide information on this aspect, this paper
aims to document and describe the privatization process of the last decade in Tur-
key, and to discuss possible reasons for the findings. Thus, this paper will provide
a multifaceted portrait of the privatization program in Turkey and will help en-
hance the insight on the issue of privatization in emerging markets.
Previous Privatization Experience
A major factor behind the privatization movement that swept the world in the last
two decades is the poor performance of the public enterprises as measured by
profits. The well-known study by Boycko et al. (1996) discusses the motivation of
the politicians who forego the company profits on behalf of excess employment.
In a more recent study, Sinilcalco et al. (2001) empirically investigate the reasons
and factors that affect privatization. They find that financial development as re-
flected by the capital market development, economic development, and demo-
cratic governments are positively related to privatization efforts. Similar to earlier
studies, they also decide that financial distress triggers the privatization process.
Starting in the late 1970s, various countries initialized programs to reform SOEs.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, more than 2,000 SOEs were privatized in developing
countries, and 6,800 enterprises worldwide (Kikeri et al. 1992). In Western Europe,
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privatization started in the early 1980s. The main reasons for privatization were the
prevailing economic conditions, structural changes in some industries, and the in-
creasing globalization in both the product and finance markets (Vickers and Wright
1989). Among the OECD countries, New Zealand and the United Kingdom had the
highest privatization proceeds as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), by
14.1 percent and 11.9 percent, respectively, during the 1979–91 period. However,
Turkey only averaged 1.6 percent during the 1988–91 period (Cook and Kirkpatrick
1994).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the privatization process started in the
newly independent states and other socialist economies. In mixed economies,
privatization is a tool for increasing the efficiency of the SOEs, whereas in the
former socialist economies, it is an end in itself, essential to transform to a market
system. In the Western countries and in many developing countries, each
privatization transaction is handled individually in which valuation of the priva-
tized enterprises becomes one of the most important features. In developed coun-
tries, 90 percent of all privatizations until the beginning of the 1990s involved
private sales, or public share offerings. In many developing countries, however,
privatizations have been mainly through the sale of assets because of underdevel-
oped capital markets. However, in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former
Soviet Union, to achieve a speedy means of transferring ownership and thereby
ensuring the reliance on market forces, mass privatization programs (MPPs) have
emerged. MPPs involve grouping firms to be privatized and distribution of shares
of state enterprises to the public, either for free or for a minimal charge. This is
usually done through a voucher system, which takes the form of certificates or
scrip distributed to the population and convertible into shares in state enterprises
through an auction process (Lieberman et al. 1995). Boycko et al. (1994) state that
the motivation behind mass privatization in such countries is to a great extent po-
litical; that is, to allow a large amount of the public to benefit from privatization,
and to prevent the transfer of assets to ex-Communists.
Perotti and Guney (1993) examine the privatization programs across developed
and developing countries, that is, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Chile, Nigeria,
Turkey, and Malaysia. They find evidence that suggests that the structure of
privatization sales are not very different among these countries, that is, mostly
partial sales; and that there is often underpricing in initial public offerings (IPOs).
Various privatization techniques have been employed by different countries.
For example, in the United Kingdom privatization has been mostly through trade
sale or flotation in the stock market (H.M. Treasury 1996); in France the most
common techniques are sales on the open market and employee buyouts (Durand
1996); in Portugal mostly public offerings are used (Sergio 1996); in Argentina
tenders and public offerings are used together (Harteneck and McMahon 1996); in
Korea public auctions, public share offerings, and trade sales are used (Kim 1996);
and in Malaysia the most common methods are sale of equity, sale of assets, and
build–operate–transfer (Ibrahim 1996).
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Table 1 presents summary information regarding the privatization methods world-
wide. In the eighty-nine countries included in the table (Turkey is excluded from
the analysis), the most popular methods in the mixed economies are private or block
sales, and public offerings followed by liquidation or sale of assets, lease and man-
agement contracts. However, in Eastern and Central Europe and in CIS (Common-
wealth of Independent States) countries, MPPs are the most common programs.
Examination of Table 1 also shows that MPPs are not used in other countries. Al-
though most of the socialist economies have MPPs, each country has different imple-
mentation schemes (Estrin 1994; Lieberman et al. 1995; Paliwoda 1995).
State-Owned Enterprises in Turkey
Before discussing the privatization experience in Turkey, we would like to intro-
duce the reader to characteristics of the SOEs in Turkey. First, SOEs were estab-
lished in 1938 as state holding companies within the body of étatism or statism.1
Such companies were formed to provide the impetus for industralization in Tur-
key, and thus they were established mainly in the sectors that required high initial
capital. Considering the fact that the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 after
World War I on the remnants of the Ottoman Empire with debts to repay and with
an almost nonexistent business class in the modern sense, the choice of statism
seems appropriate. The main duties of such enterprises were twofold: to produce
basic consumer goods, or basic materials, and to provide an education ground in
modern management techniques. In the late 1940s, politicians and bureaucrats
opted for growth through private enterprises and away from statism. In the post-
1950 period, private establishments became increasingly important. However, the
SEEs continued to perform a major role in the industralization process while go-
ing through modifications. In later years, the SEEs underwent structural reform by
Law No. 440 and Decree No. 233. To avoid semantic confusion among the names
of SOEs some definitions are in order:
• state economic enterprises (SEEs): wholly owned state economic enterprises
established for a business function to operate similar to private companies;
• public economic enterprises (PEEs): wholly owned SEEs founded to pro-
duce and market scarce goods and services for the welfare of the public;
• subsidiaries: enterprises wholly owned by an SEE or a PEE;
• associated companies: private corporations in which an SEE or a PEE has
more than 50 percent ownership;
• equity investments: private corporations in which SEEs or PEEs or their sub-
sidiaries have ownership of up to 50 percent; and
• plants or assets: local operating units wholly owned by subsidiaries or eq-
uity investments.
In total, there are thirty-six SEEs and PEEs, of which the SEEs make up 78
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percent), most of which are owned by SEEs (91 percent), and 429 state equity
investments, of which 89 percent are owned by SEEs. These numbers clearly dem-
onstrate the importance of the SEEs for the economy.
Through the years, SEEs contributed to both industrial production and capital
formation in the country. In the 1980s, the public sector accounted for about 50
percent of total fixed assets and about 40 percent of total value added in the manu-
facturing industries (Onis 1991). Furthermore, they provided basic goods to the
manufacturing enterprises at subsidized prices. Table 2 reflects the importance of
SEEs in the Turkish economy by showing the basic indicators reflecting their per-
formance. They account for about 25 percent of the annual imports and about 6
percent of annual exports on average during the 1989–95 period. In the same pe-
riod, they employed about 3 percent of the total employees in Turkey, and realized
on average 10 percent of annual total fixed investments in the country.
However, in the course of their development, most of the SEEs operated in
monopolistic or oligopolistic markets. At the same time, they were highly pro-
tected under the import substitution strategy prevailing at the time. Furthermore,
they became the support establishments for the governments through the decades
via employment expansion for political reasons. As a result of these opposing
developments, the efficiency and performance of SEEs deteriorated over the years.
Consequently, they started to draw from the central government budget and finally
became a burden. In the second half of the 1970s, various strategies were dis-
cussed to reform the SEEs. The SEEs were considered to be part of Mustafa
Ataturk’s (founder of the Turkish Republic) heritage and therefore proponents of
this view did not even consider privatizing them. However, another group favored
private entrepreneurship and opted for privatization. The reforms never really
achieved the purposes they set forth to achieve. Thus the productivity and effi-
ciency of these companies decreased more, and due to their effect on the economy
their price increases accelerated inflation in the 1970s and into the 1980s.
Privatization in Turkey
Legal Aspects
On January 24, 1980, the Turkish government announced an economic decree that
began the liberalization of the Turkish economy. The primary objectives of this
decree can be summarized as follows:
1. the administration will take measures to promote export trading;
2. the administration will take measures to privatize the SOEs, its subsidiaries,
and investments;
3. the exchange rate system will be floating rather than the fixed rate system
that was used in the past; and
4. the administration will reduce its intervention in the markets, and interest
rates will be determined by market forces.
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To implement their decision to privatize the SOEs, the government passed Law
No. 2983 (February 29, 1984), which permitted the sale of the assets of these
firms. This law also allowed the state to lease SEEs to the private sector for a
certain period of time. In 1986, the Mass Housing and Public Participation Admin-
istration was founded with Decree No. 3291 to oversee the privatization of the
SEEs. Another major legal structuring of privatization was put into effect in 1990
that dissolved Mass Housing and Public Participation Administration, and estab-
lished Public Participation Administration to control all privatization-related is-
sues. On November 24, 1994, Privatization Law No. 4046 went into effect in which
the Privatization High Council and the Privatization Administration and the
Privatization Fund were established, and the Public Participation Administration
was dissolved (Turk Ekonomi Bankasi 1995). This law is the most encompassing
one in that it regulates privatization of the SEEs, PEEs, public banks, and public
services. Moreover, a fund was established (Privatization Fund) in a state-owned
bank to accumulate all privatization revenues in the same account. Similarly, all
privatization-related expenses are covered by this fund. Furthermore, regulations
for foreign investors are established in which it is stated that asset sales to foreign
investors should follow the reciprocity principle.
In 1985, a consortium prepared the Privatization Master Plan (PMP) for the
State Planning Organization. In the master plan no distinction is made between the
SEEs and the PEEs. In the plan, thirty-two SEEs have been categorized in three
main groups, and priority is given to the following SEEs: Turban (tourism), THY
(national airline company), USAS (airline catering), Yemsan, Citosan (cement),
TPAO (petroleum), and Etibank (bank and mining) (Kilci 1998). However, this
master plan was not realized in later years. Some of these companies are still in the
portfolio of the Privatization Administration, for example, THY, and some of them
Table 2
Indicators Relating to Performance of SEEs as Percentage of Country Total
Indicator 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994a 1995a
Fixed investment 13.90 10.01 9.86 8.97 7.37 6.91 6.11
Employment 3.35 3.25 3.05 2.94 2.80 2.57 2.52
Imports 38.24 33.45 24.60 25.44 22.02 24.72b 20.44b
Exports 9.34 5.25 8.71 8.57 6.05 5.75b 5.56b
Sources: Treasury Monthly Indicators, September 1994, Turkish Republic Prime
Ministry Undersecretariat of Treasury, General Directorate of Public Finance. Monthly
Bulletin of Foreign Trade, August 1995, Turkish Republic Prime Ministry
Undersecretariat of Treasury, General Directorate of Economic Research and Assessment.
Notes: a estimates; b realized; 1995 first quarter only.
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are not even included in the privatization plan in the near future, for example,
TPAO.
Objectives of the Privatization Program
We first notice the policies and related objectives in regard to the SEEs in two main
documents—the fifth Five-Year Development Plan (FYDP), which covers the 1985–
89 period, and the PMP. As a policy, the government aims to have “profitable” and
“productive” SEEs and thus declared that necessary measures will be taken to en-
sure that SEEs are “independently” operated both administratively and financially
(FYDP, 1987). In the FYDP, it is also indicated that some investments of the SEEs
will be sold through share issuance. However, it is also stated that SEEs are expected
to continue investing in fixed assets, especially in energy, mining, transportation,
and communication sectors, and to continue increasing the amount of investment
over the planning period. In terms of financing such investments, the plan clearly
states the desire to reduce the fund transfers from the general budget to the SEEs and
to obtain funds from foreign sources while encouraging the SEE cost savings.
In the PMP, the following points emerge as the goals of privatization (Keller et
al. 1994, p. 16):
• stimulating the economy;
• improving productivity and efficiency;
• increasing the quality and mixture of goods and services offered;
• providing incentives and means for wider shareholder group;
• enhancing the development of the capital market;
• minimizing state financial support and fund transfer to the SEEs;
• improving labor productivity through share purchases by the workers;
• balancing private and public ownership in the market;
• attracting foreign investment; and
• generating revenues for the government.
From the two documents, it appears that the most important aspects are the
efficient operation of SEEs and reaching to a well-balanced productive economy
that stimulates capital market development. In the following sections of the paper,
we will address these objectives when we appraise the privatization process.
The Privatization Process
The first step in privatization is to include a specific SEE in the privatization port-
folio of the Privatization Administration. The effect of this procedure is a change
in the legal status of that SEE. From then on, the SEE starts to operate more freely
from political influence under the umbrella of the Privatization Administration.
Between 1985 and December 1998, a total of 177 wholly or partially state-owned
firms were taken in to the scope of the privatization portfolio (Kilci 1998). This
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number is the final number reached in December 1998 after some of the firms
were dropped from the original list. Twenty enterprises have been eliminated from
the original list, and the majority of the ones dropped from the original list have
been acquired by the other state-owned companies. Originally, ten SEEs and one
PEE (THY) were included in the privatization plan. In 1992, one of the SEEs was
acquired by another SEE and thus was eliminated from the list (DPT 1994; Turk
Ekonomi Bankasi 1995).
Table 3 presents information about the number of SOEs, showing how many
were included in the privatization portfolio, and how many of the SOEs that were
included in the portfolio were privatized. The Privatization Administration com-
pletely privatized 113 enterprises between 1985 and 1998.2 State ownership in
these companies ranged between 2.9 percent and 100 percent, with a mean of 58.7
percent and median of 49 percent. Among these companies, we observe that only
three are SEEs. One of the SEEs was transferred to the workers, and the other two
were dissolved through asset sales.
Among the total state-owned or participated enterprises of 604 firms, only 177,
or 29.3 percent, are included in the privatization portfolio. Although a higher
percentage of wholly owned state enterprises (SEEs and PEEs) were included in the
portfolio (50 percent), complete privatization of such enterprises displays the lowest
percentage among the categories, with only 16.7 percent, which is equivalent to
privatization of 8.3 percent of the total of such companies. The highest privatization
ratio is obtained in the subsidiary category, with 78.8 percent of the firms being
privatized, which is followed by equity investments (64.5 percent). In the earlier
years of the privatization process, mostly plant assets were sold through block sales.
The first public offering took place in 1988, with the partial privatization of Teletas
shares, a communication company. As of December 1998, 29.5 percent of all sub-
sidiaries and 16.1 percent of all equity investments have been completely privatized.
The main reasons for this finding are the economic viability and organizational
and legal structure of the companies that are privatized. Most of them were estab-
lished as corporations that can easily issue stocks without necessitating a change in
the existing laws. The low percentage obtained in the SEEs category is mainly due to
political reasons, that is, the reluctance of opposing groups to privatize the enterprises
that are regarded as strategic for the economic growth and the defense of the country.
The period that passed from the date of decision to privatize to actual privatization
ranged from one month to nine years, with an average of three years. The highest
average period is obtained in the equity investments category by 3.8 years. In
subsidiary investments, the average period is 2.9 years.
The percentage of state ownership in the forty-one subsidiaries ranges between
52 percent and 100 percent, with a median of 100 percent. In the equity invest-
ments category, stake-hold ranges between 2.29 percent and 99 percent, with a
mean of 34.5 percent and a median of 30 percent (Table 4).
Although various combinations of privatization methods are utilized, the most
common method is block sales in all categories. Table 4 reveals that the majority








































































































































































































of companies were privatized through block sales only—except the companies
that are included in the equity investments. In the equity investments category, we
see that besides block sales, public offerings and sales at the stock market and their
combinations are used. Almost 20 percent of the companies in this category were
privatized through the capital market.
Besides these completely privatized companies, some partial sales of shares
have taken place. A total of sixteen companies in the privatization portfolio have
been partially privatized. The makeup is as follows: one PEE, six SEEs, four sub-
sidiaries, and five equity investments. Most of the partial privatization has been
accomplished by gradual asset sales. The SEEs in this group are monopolists, or
are important for the regional or the national economy, and strategy, for example,
Erdemir (a major steel company), THY (Turkish Airlines), and PETKIM (petro-
leum). The political debate whether to privatize such companies still continues. In
a few cases, the opposing group took the privatization decision to a higher court
and obtained verdicts to reverse the sales, even after a few years. Therefore, the
Privatization Administration is extremely careful in privatizing companies with
strategic importance. The percentage of ownership of such strategically important
and large companies that have been privatized through the stock market by either
initial or second offerings or sales of shares at the market is minimal, within a
range of 1.8 to 6.5 percent of the total shares.
Only one PEE (THY) and six SEEs were privatized, which resulted in very insig-
nificant ownership transfers; that is, the privatized share percentage is less than 10
percent. Complete privatizations have mostly taken place in subsidiaries and equity
investments. Perotti (1995) provides an explanation for the gradual transfer of own-
ership and states that when companies are highly sensitive to public policy choices,
those companies will tend to be privatized with small initial shares. The findings in
Turkey also support this theory. Therefore, Turkey still needs to privatize the re-
maining SEEs before realizing the full effects of the privatization program.
As of December 1998, there existed seventy-six firms and some fixed assets in
the privatization list. In thirty-five of these, the state owns more than 50 percent.
Some of these companies are the most important companies for the Turkish
economy; for example, Eregli Demir Çelik is the major steel company, and THY is
the national airline company. Nine SEEs and one PEE are still in the privatization
program, with almost 100 percent shares. Although privatization of these compa-
nies is reflected in the annual government statements, complete privatization of
these companies has not been accomplished yet.
Evaluation of the Privatization Process
Development of the Capital Market
One of the aims of the privatization process was to enhance the development of the
capital market that was established in 1986, just as the talks of privatization of the











































































































































































































SEEs started. In this section, we will try to assess the effect of privatization on the
stock market.
As of the end of 1998, there were thirty-five companies traded on the ISE that
were partially or completely privatized by the Privatization Administration. These
companies were privatized by IPOs, second offerings, block sales, international
offerings, or by a combination of these methods. Tables 5 and 6 present informa-
tion about the companies traded on the market. The Privatization Administration
holds shares in eight companies, with ownership ranging from 0.01 percent (due
to stock dividends that occurred after the second offering) to 98.17 percent (THY).
Among the thirty-five companies that are currently traded on the ISE, eighteen
were privatized by IPOs that took place between 1988 and 1991. A public announce-
ment is made in which the date of offering and price is made public and number
share requests (demands) from the investors are gathered. The number of share
requests for IPOs and for second-offerings indicates that investors are mostly inter-
ested in the privatized companies with track records in the stock market. There are,
on the average, 19,423 demands for the second offerings, but only 11,190 demands
for the IPOs. We believe that informed investors follow such announcements when
they form their portfolios. This was the case in a recent offering in which the offer
price was heavily discounted in 1998; the case of second offerings of IS BANK.
Perotti and Guney (1993) draw attention to the extent of underpricing in IPOs.
When we examine the performance of initial offerings, we fail to notice premiums
of that extent. In six of the companies, the first day price is higher than the offer
price, with an average of 15.72 percent, and the first day prices of four companies
are lower than the offer price, with an average of 9.03 percent. In the remaining
eight cases, the offer price is the same as the first day market price. The overall
effect is an average premium of 0.03 percent (median 0 percent). The strongest
underpricing is noticed in a cement company (Afyon Cimento), with 30 percent.
On the other hand, when the second offerings are examined, we see a different
picture. In all nine second offerings, the first day market price immediately in-
creased within the range of 1.6 percent to 29.2 percent, with a mean of 8.76 per-
cent and a median of 5.94 percent. Except one company (USAS), all sales in the
stock market as initial or second public offerings are partial sales. When we exam-
ine the average daily proceeds from such sales and the daily average trade volume
of the ISE at that time, we see that only five of the IPOs reached a trading volume
that is greater than the 10 percent of the average daily trading volume. However, in
eight of the nine second offerings, daily average sales exceeded 10 percent of
average daily trading volume of the market.
We summarize the number of privatization transactions and the methods in
Table 7. Examination of the table reveals that, initially, privatization started with
asset sales that are mostly sales of incomplete plants. Overall asset sales and block
sales are the most prevalent methods by 50 percent and 24 percent, respectively, a
pattern that is also observed in other developing mixed economies. When the tim-
ing of transactions is examined, we see that most transactions have taken place in
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the 1991–98 period, reaching its maximum in 1993. In 1993, sales of shares in the
stock market also reached its maximum value. During the 1990–94 period, the
Privatization Administration acted as market maker to some extent, which is evi-
denced by the number of public offerings and share sales at the stock market.
However, there were complaints from the general public, and they have changed
their strategy since then.
The prevalent privatization methods and the perceived capital market effects of
share offerings of privatized firms lead us to believe that privatization process did
not really provide the impetus for the capital market development as it was origi-
nally anticipated.
Privatization Revenues
Although generating revenues was ranked lower than other objectives of
privatization, when it is interpreted within the context of the FYDP, it becomes
important. It is important from two perspectives: foreign investments and transfers
from the central budget. Table 8 gives the amount of privatization revenues be-
tween 1985 and December 1998 in terms of U.S. dollars. A total of $4.5 million
was obtained from the privatization revenues during this period, in which block
sales consist of 44.65 percent, international offerings 15.79 percent, asset sales
13.21 percent, sales at the stock market 11.57 percent, IPOs 6.18 percent, and
second offerings 8.59 percent. The findings of Kilci (1998) show that 46 percent
of total privatization revenues came from sales of shares in equity investments, 32
percent from subsidiary sales, and 21 percent from sales of SEEs. Furthermore,
the findings disclose that almost 50 percent of the total privatization revenues as of
the end of 1997 are provided by privatization of twelve companies. Sale of shares
in one of these companies, CITOSAN (cement), which is partially privatized, makes
up 26 percent of the total revenues. The main reasons for this finding are the good
performance record of the company, the organization of the company that permits
it to operate free from political pressures, the suitability of the company to partial
sales, and the demand of investors. As discussed previously, these partial
privatization realizations provided as much revenues as the complete privatizations.
Furthermore, although there are only two international offerings, they provide al-
most 16 percent of the privatization revenues, whereas asset sales, although largest
in number, provide only about 13 percent of the total privatization revenues.
The revenues are mostly provided by the domestic investors (77.66 percent). We
notice international investors in 1989, 1994, and 1998 especially. Most of the inter-
national investors are multinational companies operating in, for example, cement
(France), cable networking (Finnish), electronics (Germany), and automotive (Italy).
In an earlier paper, Molz (1990) points out the multinational company involvement
in the Turkish privatization and discusses the advantages and disadvantages for the
multinational company in general. There was opposition to sales to foreign compa-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Except in 1994, we notice an increase in the funds provided by domestic
investors. In 1994, Turkey faced a major financial crisis and as a result there was
heavy devaluation of the Turkish lira against all strong currencies. The perfor-
mance of the stock market declined in that period as well. These two factors
contributed to the decrease in the funds provided by domestic investors in that
year. When the development of revenues is examined, we see that almost 97
percent of the total revenues have been generated since 1990, with fluctuating
amounts. Although privatization revenues never generated outstanding amounts,
they averaged around 33 percent of the gross national product (GNP) in the 1990s.
Privatization revenues reached their peak percentage of GNP in 1993 at 73 percent
(Table 8).
Table 9 presents the sources and uses of privatization funds during the 1986–97
period. The amount of cash generated from privatization revenues in this period
makes up 65.42 percent of the total cash in flow. The amount of total sales between
1986 and 1997 was $3.54 billion (from Table 8; total sales as of the end of 1997)
and cash collection from privatization revenues in the same period was $3.16 bil-
lion, which gives a collection ratio of 89 percent. A major portion of the funds is
collected from dividend income from shares of companies in the privatization port-
folio (26.83 percent). The main expenditures in the same period are incurred for
capital increases of the companies in the privatization portfolio (44.45 percent)
and transfers to the Turkish Treasury.
Examination of Table 9 reveals that the total cash provided by the privatization
revenues is enough to cover all direct privatization expenses, but does not cover
the indirect expenses such as capital transfers and payments to the Turkish Trea-
sury. Capital increases and transfers show the amount of cash transferred to the
companies in the portfolio for betterment and rehabilitation purposes. These trans-
fers are not used to pay the debts of such companies. Transfers to the Turkish
Treasury are obligatory amounts determined by related laws; the latest one is Law
No. 4046, which was mentioned earlier in this paper. Sometimes the Privatization
Administration even borrows to pay this amount; for example, in 1995 the admin-
istration obtained foreign loans to comply with the obligation to the Turkish Trea-
sury. The amount of net cash inflow, only $239 million over the initial thirteen-year
period, does not appear to be satisfactory to accomplish the initial goals of the
privatization program in Turkey. To summarize, we could state that the privatization
process attracted some foreign investment; however, still most of the funding was
provided through the domestic investors. The amount of transfers from the central
budget was around $400 million during the 1985–86 period. Later, the amount
started to increase and reached its peak level in 1991 at $3.2 billion. After 1994,
the withdrawals from the central budget started to decrease gradually to about
$950 million in 1998.3 Although we could possibly state that some positive effect
of privatization was felt on the central budget by not keeping the transfers at the
highest level, it is quite hard to defend the notion that privatization helped to achieve
the goal of decreasing the funds flow from the central budget because the amount
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of transfers when the privatization process started was almost one-third of the
amount after a decade of privatization.
Productivity Improvements
Improving the productivity and efficiency of the economy appears to be one of the
main objectives of the privatization program as well as the FYDP. In this section,
Table 9
Cash Proceeds from Privatization Activities, 1985–97





Sale at ISE 524.10
Block sales 1,583.13
Total from privatization 3,155.89
From other sources:
Dividend revenue 1,294.16
Privatization bills issued 24.14
Collection of loans 19.64
Loans and grants 259.86
Other 70.40
Subtotal 1,668.20
Total cash in flow 4,824.09
Cash outflow:
Direct expenses:





Social assistance supplements 100.95
Direct expenses total 2,652.42
Indirect expenses:
Transfers to treasury 1,375.42
Loans extended to companies 382.19
Loan repayments 134.04
Others 40.90
Indirect expenses total 1,932.55
Total outflow 4,584.97
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we will present a comparison of the performance of the companies, before and
after privatization, in order to assess the effect of privatization by examining the
performance of sample firms privatized by different methods.
We will start our analysis with plant sales. Examination of the productivity of
such companies before and after privatization yields mixed results. When plants
were sold with the condition that they should continue production and keep the
production at a certain level, after privatization the companies on average achieved
and passed the benchmark by the second year after privatization. Labor productiv-
ity increases because of the increase in production and the decrease in the number
of employees. At the end of the second year, such companies operate with around
66 percent of the labor force that was available before privatization.4 Therefore,
the goal of increasing productivity is achieved in these cases. Table 10 provides a
summary of these companies.
However, the production level of such companies decreased by almost 32 per-
cent and, moreover, some of them have closed. Therefore, we observe a higher
decrease in the labor force; the total number of employees drops to about 40 per-
cent of the starting workforce (see Table 10). As a result, overall labor productivity
has increased.5 Hence, one could argue that the privatization of such plant sales
did not help to improve the domestic production but decreased the amount of
burden on the central budget.
Next, we are going to examine the performance of some of the companies
that were privatized by block sales. Our sample consists of nine companies in
which the state had more than 50 percent ownership. The new owners undertook
new capital investments in these companies. In one case, however, the Privatization
Administration paid for 40 percent of the investments. In this special case, the
steel factory was sold to the employees for a very minimal amount of money.
Average capacity utilization of these companies increased from 63 percent to 67
percent, whereas the number of employees decreased by 6 percent. The cement
companies that were always cited as examples of successful privatization face
a capacity utilization rate decrease after privatization, down by 9 percent from
75 percent, accompanying a 50 percent reduction in workforce. Furthermore,
although they were profitable before privatization, they started to incur losses
afterward.
Panel B of Table 10 presents summary income statements of five of the compa-
nies privatized through block sales. Although operating income increases consid-
erably after privatization, this positive effect does not carry into after-tax profits,
but reduces the amount of losses. In summary, privatization improved the produc-
tivity of some companies but did not have the same effect on other companies. In
terms of financial performance, none of the companies provides satisfactory re-
sults. Thus, we could argue that block sales or asset sales did not contribute to a
well-balanced economy and fail short of accomplishing the goals stated earlier
such as: stimulating the economy, improving the productivity and efficiency, and
increasing the quality and mixture of goods and services offered.
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Conclusion
In this paper, the privatization program in the Turkish economy is investigated,
and brief background information is provided. Although there were debates on
whether to privatize or to rehabilitate the SEEs in the past two decades, the deci-
sion to privatize is taken with the economic reforms in the early 1980s. The major
portion of the privatization activities involves the sale of state shares in already
established private companies. Although the state is willing to sell its shares in
existing private firms, or small state enterprises, major SEEs and state banks are
yet to be privatized. One of the main reasons is the opposition from the leftist
parties who want to reform the SEEs rather than selling them.
Various privatization methods have been utilized in this process. The most com-
mon method of privatization is block sales. We notice IPOs by the Privatization
Administration in the period when the stock market was not as developed. Since
then, liberalization in the stock market and opening the market to foreign investors
have been successfully implemented. Consequently, although the Istanbul Stock
Exchange is still an emerging market, it has shown considerable development
since it was founded in 1986. The most significant case that had some effect on
the stock market is the privatization of TELETAS in 1988 when the market was
not as developed.
As this paper indicates, the Turkish administrations have only achieved partial
progress in the privatization of state-owned economic enterprises. At this time, the
performance of the companies privatized through plant and block sales displays a
rather gloomy picture in terms of achieving the initially stated objectives in both
the fifth FYDP and the Privatization Master Plan. Furthermore, the initial and
second public offerings in the stock market of the shares of some SOEs did not
provide the expected impetus. Unfortunately, we also fail to observe the positive
effects of privatization on the economy. The major state economic enterprises,
such as Turkish Airlines, Eregli Steel Company, and Petrol Ofis, have not been
privatized yet. We will be able to fully judge the success of the process only after
privatization of these big companies has taken place.
Notes
1. “Etatism was a means of building a national economy based on private enterprise,
through the protection and support of the state and in some instances its direct interventions
in the form of SEES” (Kongar 1986, p. 37).
2. The information in the following sections is obtained from the periodic bulletins of
the Republic of Turkey Privatization Administration (www.oib.gov.tr/1985-1998eng.htm).
3. www.treasury.gov.tr, November 2001
4. T.C. Basbakanlik Ozellestirme Idaresi Baskanligi, Ozellestirme Oncesi ve Sonrasi
Faaliyet Bilgileri, Ozellestirme Sonrasi Takip Grup Baskanligi, Nisan 2000—Varlik Satisi
Yoluyla Ozellestirilen Sumer Holding ve Sut Isletmelerinin Ozellestirme Oncesi ve Sonrasi
Faaliyet Bilgileri [Republic of Turkey, Privatization Administration of the Prime Ministry,
Information on the Operations Before and After Privatization, Office of Monitoring After
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Privatization, April 2000—Operating information before and after privatization regarding
Sumer Holding and Sumer Sut that were privatized through asset sale].
5. See note 4.
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